Health management contracts in Costa Rica from a comparative perspective by Sojo, Ana
T E P I L 
,R E V I E W, 
N U M B E R 66 
D E C E M B E R 1 998 
S A N T I A G O , C H I L E 
O S C A R A L T I M I R 
Director of the Review 
E U G E N I O L A H E R A 
Technical Secretary 
UNITED NATIONS 
C E P A L R E V I E W 66 
C O N T E N T S 
Beyond the Washington Consensus: an ECLAC perspective 
Jose Antonio Ocampo 
The Cuban economy 
David Ibarra and Jorge Máttar 
Education in Latin America: demand and distribution are 
factors that matter 
Nancy Birdsall, Juan Luis Londoño and Lesley O'Connett 
Determinants of Inequality among urban households 
Luis Felipe Jiménez L. and Nora Ruedi A. 
Health management contracts in Costa Rica from a 
comparative perspective 
Ana Sojo 
A development strategy founded on natural resource-based 
production clusters 
Joseph Ramos 
Big Latin American industrial companies and groups 
Celso Garrido and Wilson Peres 
Between political control and efficiency gains: 
the evolution of agrarian property rights in Mexico 
Gustavo Gorditto, Alain de Janvry and Elizabeth Sadoulet 
Tariffs and the Piano Real In Brazil 










Recent ECLAC publications 189 
D E C E M B E R 1 996 
CE PAL. REVIEW 66 73 
Health management 
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Social Affairs Officer, 
Social Development Division, 
ECLAC. 
This article analyses the recent establishment of quasi-markets in 
the field of public health in Costa Rica through the internal sepa-
ration within the Costa Rican Social Security Fund of the func-
tions of revenue collection, financing, purchasing and provision 
of services; the application of a new financing model; and the 
introduction of management contracts with hospitals and health 
areas as a key instrument for allocating and transferring resources 
in accordance with performance and fulfillment of goals. The 
context and bases of the management reform are examined, and a 
description is given of both the new financing model and the 
institutional and organizational implications of the 1997 con-
tracts. These contracts are described in the light of their main 
thrusts, in which special emphasis is placed on innovations in 
terms of processes and the development of reliable records of 
activities, costs and quality, going beyond the mere use of indica-
tors of efficiency and efficacy. The performance of hospitals and 
health areas in the context of these contracts is described, and 
finally some views are expressed on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the relevant institutions and the means of optimizing resource 
allocation. Throughout the analysis comparisons are made with 
the experience of Chile. 
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I 
Introduction 
"Contracts not only provide an explicit framework within which 
empirical evidence may be derived on forms of organization 
(so that they are the basic empirical source for proving 
hypotheses on organization): they also provide clues and 
pointers on the way in which the parties to an exchange will 
structure more complex forms of organization". (Douglass North) 
Since 1996, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund 
fCCSS) has been promoting the formation of quasi-
markets in public health. Without resorting to the es-
tablishment of exogenous bodies for this purpose, the 
new organizational scheme of the cess is designed to 
separate the functions of revenue collection, financ-
ing, purchasing and provision of services at the inter-
nal level and to establish a new financing model. The 
relation between financing, purchasing and the provi-
sion of services is seen as a contractual one: manage-
ment contracts are the key instrument for the 
allocation and transfer of resources as a function of 
performance and fulfillment of goals, specifying 
health objectives and establishing agreed production 
targets for each centre, at all three levels of attention. 
In the following sections, the ambitious manage-
ment reforms undertaken by the cess will be ana-
lysed first, in the light of their context and bases, 
after which a description will be given both of the 
financing model underlying the management con-
tracts and the institutional and organizational impli-
cations of the contracts for the year 1997. 
The main aspects of the 1997 contracts are de-
scribed and highlighted, with special emphasis on the 
fact that the performance measurement which guides 
them goes beyond the mere use of indicators of effi-
ciency and efficacy, since it assigns an important role 
to the innovation of processes which should make it 
possible to systematize the provision of services, 
shed light on specific aspects of their efficacy, and 
contribute both to organizational restructuring and to 
changes in management culture. The importance as-
signed to the preparation of reliable records on activi-
ties, costs and quality and the establishment of 
information systems which can strengthen manage-
ment capacity is also highlighted. The contracts also 
promote the development of an adequate system of 
referrals and counter-referrals. 
An account is given of the performance of the hos-
pitals and health areas under the 1997 contracts in terms 
of the improvements achieved, the organizational learn-
ing process and the man obstacles. In the light of the 
evaluations made by the cess and other elements, some 
opinions are presented on institutional strengths and 
weaknesses and on the means of optimizing resource 
allocation. Finally, some elements which could stand in 
the way of the process of innovation are mentioned. 
Official documentation and interviews and ex-
changes of ideas with the health authorities and offi-
cials who have been involved in the institutional 
innovation process were the main source for this 
analysis,1 which provides a detailed overview of this 
particular aspect of the reform process.2 
In Latin America,3 the public health systems of 
Chile and Costa Rica are the only ones which have 
established management contracts with public suppli-
ers, thereby progressing through this process of nego-
tiation towards the formation of quasi-markets. This 
is the reason for the constant comparisons made with 
the Chilean experience in some aspects.4 
Among the factors of the greatest importance for the execution of 
this study were the interest shown by Alvaro Salas, then Executive 
President of the CCSS, his willing collaboration, and that of the 
authorities and officials who granted us interviews and facilitated 
our free access to the documentation (see list of interviewees at the 
end of this article). The author, however, bears sole responsibility 
for the processing and interpretation of the information provided. 
No complete analysis exists in this respect. For an updated 
overview of the reform of the Costa Rican health sector in the 
last four years, in terms of both its direction and execution, see 
Costa Rica, M1DEPLAN, 1998, pp. 190-220. 
3
 In the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago has also established 
separation of functions and annual service agreements. 
4
 With regard to the context and initial thrust of the introduction 
of management contracts in Chile, see Sojo (1996b and 1996c). 
We wish to express our thanks to the Chilean authorities for the 
interviews granted and the access provided to the documentation 
on these matters (see list of interviewees). 
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II 
The context and opportuneness 
of the reforms 
In the 1980s there was an administrative restructur-
ing on the CCSS and an adjustment in its financial 
base. Although the conflictive delineation of areas of 
competence between the Ministry of Health and the 
CCSS became a stumbling block for the reform of the 
Costa Rican health system at that time (Sojo, 1993; 
Guendel and Trejos, 1994), growing agreement about 
the morphology of the system made it possible to 
clarify their respective areas competence in the mid-
1990s. 
In 1993, the restructuring of the Ministry of 
Health was approved and it was made responsible for 
the functions of general guidance (which need to be 
further strengthened) and promotion, while the CCSS 
was made responsible for operational activities in the 
field of health in the areas of promotion, prevention, 
recovery and rehabilitation. 
Since 1994, primary attention and preventive ac-
tivities have been strengthened through Basic Integral 
Health Attention Teams (EBAIS). The primary health 
attention activities carried out by the Ministry of 
Health since the 1970s were gradually transferred to 
the cess and became part of the model based on 
those teams,5 while the Ministry retained control of 
three programmes: health promotion and protection, 
protection and improvement of the human environ-
ment, and child nutrition and development. The sign-
ing of the management contracts resulted in the 
transfer of Ministry of Health staff to the CCSS, since 
the health areas had difficulties in fulfilling their 
management contracts when the latter were not given 
effective backing: in one year, from January 1997, 
1027 staff members were transferred. 
The present reforms in the management of the 
CCSS are taking place at a time when the financial 
resources of this institution have been placed on a 
sounder basis at two levels. The cess provides health 
services for the population under a system financed 
5
 For a description of the global thrust of the reforms, see Salas 
(1996) and Wemstock (1995). For an analysis of the changes 
made in the health sector in the last four years, see Costa Rica, 
MIDEPLAN, 1998, pp. 190-211. 
from compulsory tripartite contributions, with a 
scheme of universal benefits. The total contribution 
amounts to 7.5% of the payroll: the employer pays 
4.75%, the worker 2.5% and the State the remaining 
0.25%. The heavy outstanding debt built up by the 
State with the CCSS during decades was negotiated 
and paid off in 1997. The financial consolidation of 
the CCSS was further strengthened by the 1995 pen-
sion reforms, which introduced a pension system run 
by the CCSS as the exclusive system of pensions pay-
able from the national budget. Within this process, 
the finances of the health system were also placed on 
a sounder basis (Sojo, 1997b). 
The present reforms in the management of the 
CCSS are an ad hoc initiative designed in the light of 
a searching self-critical diagnosis6 on the charac-
teristics of the CCSS as compared with its objectives, 
and do not form part of a broad exercise on the part 
of the Costa Rican State in the field of management. 
Within this area, the most far-reaching policy in this 
period is the implementation, through some pilot 
agreements, of the National Evaluation System 
(SINE), designed and coordinated by MIDEPLAN. The 
SINE is based on the signing of annual performance 
agreements -commitments to achieve certain results-
between the President of the Republic and the corre-
sponding authorities, endorsed by MIDEPLAN and the 
Ministry of Finance. The institutional performance 
matrix specifies the priority programmes and pro-
jects, the evaluation indicators, the ranking of each 
programme, and the institutional commitments en-
tered into in each case (Mora, 1998). The institutions 
which have fulfilled their targets best have received 
public praise, but the system has not yet entered on a 
stage of individual evaluation or rewards. 
Other specific initiatives in the area of manage-
ment have also been carried out, such as the reform 
of the Customs Service and the coordination and in-
6
 The arguments underlying the CCSS's diagnosis of the struc-
tural problems of the institution with regard to management and 
financing are analysed in section III. 
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tegration of the programmes against poverty under 
the National Anti-poverty Plan. 
Unlike anti-State management reform proposals, 
which see the State as a problem but not as part 
of the solution (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and 
Pettigrew, 1996, p. 11), the CCSS management reform 
seeks to maintain and consolidate social and public 
responsibility for the enjoyment of health as one of 
the rights of the citizen and to increase its contribu-
tion to the systemic competitiveness of the country 
through better use of resources and greater attention 
to quality. 
These aims are reflected in the guiding principles 
of the new financing model -solidarity, universality 
and equity- which became the backbone of the re-
form of the CCSS as from 1996.7 
The authorities of the CCSS saw that there were 
clear shortcomings in terms of management, but 
when trying to decide the best timing for the intro-
duction of management contracts they were faced 
with a dilemma: whether first of all to build up the 
management capacity needed in order to assign re-
sources in line with performance and then bring in 
the management contracts (a longer process which 
might not be practical in political terms) or whether 
to adopt the system of contracts and learn by experi-
ence. This second approach was finally adopted.8 
Within a short space of time, the central authorities of 
the CCSS formulated an alternative financing model 
and worked out the features of the contracts, in order 
to make progress in that direction, with repercussions 
on the global management of the CCSS. The execution 
of a pilot plan was begun, and an intensive training 
programme was put into effect.9 
It is interesting to reflect on the political factors 
which have made possible the realization of the re-
forms in this sector. A reasonable degree of continu-
7
 Equity in the distribution of resources is defined as "equal 
opportunities of access to health services by all users with equal 
needs" (CCSS, Proyecto de Modernización, 1997a, p. 36). 
8
 Statements by Alvaro Salas at the interview of 5 February 
1998. 
9
 We were told that during six months, the authorities and those 
responsible for the contracts of the bodies providing services had 
to leave their jobs for this purpose for three or four days a week 
(interview with Manrique Soto Pacheco, Director of the San 
Juan de Dios hospital, 5 February 1998). Paradoxically, in some 
cases the training conflicted with the objectives pursued: accord-
ing to the 1997 evaluation of hospitals, the fact that those re-
sponsible for organizing the process had to leave their work for 
training activities gave rise to difficulties in following up the 
contracts. 
ity has been achieved because the modernization pro-
ject was begun in the Calderón Fournier administra-
tion and was adopted with the unanimous vote of the 
majority political parties.10 This continuity was also 
aided by the fact that the technical team then respon-
sible for designing the reform of the CCSS sub-
sequently occupied strategic posts in the Figueres 
Olsen administration, including the post of Executive 
President. 
The management reform was preceded by dis-
cussions on how to improve the use of resources in 
the field of health; in 1994, for example, a high-level 
hospital commission was set up. From October to 
December 1996, meetings and negotiations were held 
at the behest of the central authorities of the CCSS to 
decide on the path to be followed in the organization 
of management contracts. At the start, a number of 
the actors had negative reactions: for example, the 
trade unions complained that the idea was to save 
resources or open up the way for privatization.1 ' Even 
at the central level of the CCSS itself there was and 
continues to be some doubt about the management 
contracts, which are seen as a weakening of central 
action. The hospital directors, who were mostly skep-
tical to begin with, gradually became more interested, 
as the expansion of their autonomy would give them 
more instruments for tackling their problems, and the 
hospitals which were in a better position to begin the 
process began to act as leaders. The innovation was 
actively supported by the Executive, which even took 
part in a meeting with hospital directors'2 on 
"queues" and waiting lists.13 
Statements by Dr. Elias Jiménez, Director of the National 
Children's Hospital and Executive President of the CCSS from 
1990 to 1994, in an interview of 5 February 1998. 
11
 The difficulties in the dialogue about the reforms and some 
prejudices about them are clearly evident in the analysis and 
comment session described in GTSS (1997), pp. 41-70. 
The proposals made at this meeting cover very varied areas: 
equipment, systems of giving appointments, more flexible hours 
of attention, new hiring schemes, decentralization of manage-
ment, more flexible budgets, expansion of the decision-making 
capacity of general physicians, purchase of services, improve-
ments in the system of referrals, coordination of services, and 
absenteeism. 
13
 In seeking to understand this political process, the meeting 
with health authorities called by the Executive President of the 
CCSS on 26 August 1997 was extremely useful. This meeting 
was attended by Herman Weinstock, Minister of Health; Alvaro 
Salas, Executive President of the CCSS; Fernando Marin, Deputy 
Minister of Health; Julieta Rodríguez, Chief of the Medical 
Division of the CCSS, and Luis Bernardo Saenz, Director of the 
CCSS modernization project. 
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An important role was played by the consultancy 
contract signed with Andersen Consulting and the 
Hospital Consortium of Catalonia in December 1995 
to formulate proposals for prospective budgetary al-
location, separation of functions and improvement of 
quality. At the same time, the CCSS modernization 
team studied and analysed the experiences of the 
Basque Country, Catalonia, England and Sweden, 
where the systems are of an eminently public nature 
in terms of indicators and evaluation schemes 
As an illustration of the lessons learned from the 
analysis of other situations, special mention may be 
made of the "cultural change" which took place in the 
Basque Country as a result of management contracts, 
even though these were not linked with the budget: this 
experience was incorporated when the Costa Rican in-
itiative was launched in 1997 and is reflected in the 
relative looseness of the contract requirements. 
Awareness of the positive and negative aspects 
of these experiences also affected three areas of con-
cern in the design of the model: the system of pay-
ments should be such as to avoid over-supply of 
services, or manipulation in conditions of low output; 
the indicators should not be focused solely on the 
results, while overlooking the processes, since this 
would adversely affect commitment and credibility; 
and the evaluation must be seen as a strong, consis-
tent and constant process.14 
The Chilean management contracts, however, 
form part of a context which is very different from 
that of Costa Rica: i.e., a health system whose soli-
darity had been deeply undermined, Although they 
were introduced in a period of expansion of expendi-
Better use of resources, which is the central element 
in the CCSS management reform, is an urgent issue:17 
14
 These details regarding the initial phase of the process were 
collected on 29 August 1997 at a joint interview with James 
Cercone, Norma Ayala, Rodrigo Bartels and Mario León, staff 
members of the CCSS modernization project who were responsi-
ble for preparing the contracts and have participated in their 
evaluation. 
ture in which improvements in efficiency and equity 
were sought, their framework is a dual health system, 
both in terms of ownership and of the rationale behind 
its design. Privatization of the financing and supply of 
health services, which was introduced under the mili-
tary regime, promotes the transfer of those with 
higher incomes from the public to the private system. 
So far, this health system is made up of two sub-
systems which are governed by different rationales 
and do not compete with each other; the public health 
insurance is of an unfunded nature and seeks solidar-
ity, whereas the private system operates through indi-
vidual accounts and risks; consequently, the first 
system is made up of poor people, and those with 
high health risks tend to migrate to it, while the sec-
ond system consists of those with higher incomes and 
low levels of risk. 
This duality inhibits universal coverage of the 
population and efficient use of resources, militates 
against a complementary relationship between public 
and private attention, and significantly limits the ca-
pacity for regulation, with serious repercussions in 
the management area because of the leakage of re-
sources between the two subsystems.15 The inequali-
ties in health and the cases of inefficiency inherent in 
the dual model have currently given rise in Chile to a 
complex discussion on the establishment of a basic, 
solidary compulsory health insurance scheme of uni-
versal coverage which will ensure effective freedom 
to choose the type of health insurance and supplier of 
attention in the public and private fields, without any 
possibility of rejection of patients by the insurance 
institutions.16 
it is maintained that the sustainability of the system is 
at stake, as expenditure on health has been growing 
15
 With regard to the Chilean case, see Sojo (1996b and 1996c). 
16
 For details of the proposals made in this field in a study 
commissioned by the Ministry of Health, see University of 
Chile, Department of Economics, 1997. 
17
 Unless otherwise specified, the main source of this diagnosis 
is CCSS, Proyecto de Modernización, 1997a. 
Ill 
A form of resource allocation which makes 
it possible to overcome negative incentives 
HEALTH MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN COSTA RICA FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE • ANA SOJO 
78 C E P A L R E V I E W 6 6 « D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 8 
TABLE 1 
Costa Rica: Selected social indicators 
Indicator Value 
Gross mortality rate (1996) 4.12 
Infant mortality rate (1996) 11.83/» 
Life expectancy (1995) 74.8 
Total number of deaths 13 993 
Main causes of death (1996): 
Diseases of the vaso-circulatory system 4 308 
Tumours 2 902 
Injuries or poisoning 1 570 
Percentage of babies with low weight at birth 7.33 
Position in the Human Development Index (1997) 33 
Source; CCSS. 
in recent years but its productivity has remained the 
same or gone down, and the ageing of the population 
will exert growing pressure on it (table 1). Users are 
not satisfied, and this leads to double spending on 
health care when beneficiaries pay extra to obtain 
private health attention; this phenomenon entails 
costs in terms of social efficiency and also encour-
ages evasion. It is therefore necessary to control costs 
and increase efficiency in order to make an effective 
contribution to the solidarity, equity and competitive-
ness that the country seeks. 
The diagnosis on the management of the cess 
finds that control of the cess budget has been of a 
primarily administrative nature: the costs of the serv-
ices provided are not fully known, and systems of 
billing for services have not yet been developed. It is 
necessary to change the system of organization and 
IV 
1. The general concept 
The quasi-market which it is aimed to establish19 is 
based on a new organizational design of the CCSS in 
which the functions of revenue collection, financing, 
K
 Interview with Luis Bernardo Saenz, 26 February 1998. 
19
 In a quasi-market determined by a contract between a pur-
chaser and suppliers, prices are not set by the interaction of 
supply and demand and are therefore not free market prices but 
rather negotiated or managed prices. With regard to demand, the 
final consumers do not influence the price, which has been 
regulated by a government agency. The budgetary limit of that 
financing based on past allocations in order, instead, 
to provide resources as a function of efficiency, ful-
fillment of objectives, and the results and perform-
ance achieved in the areas of health attention, finance 
and quality. Good clinical practices, proper attention 
to users, and effective coordination among the differ-
ent levels of health care are considered as criteria of 
quality. 
Within a framework of rigid rules, staff remu-
nerations are determined by seniority, and no account 
is taken of performance. Although the organization of 
work is subject to detailed regulations and standard 
procedures, in the area of clinical activities the pro-
fessionals act practically without limitations, while 
the high levels of absenteeism, substitution and "sick 
leave" exceed the average levels of the country. 
Medical specialities form a kind of "captive 
market" in the hands of the specialists concerned, 
giving rise to access barriers and long waiting lists, 
even though there are cases of an obvious shortage of 
specialists, as for example in ophthalmology, ear, 
nose and throat specialities and oncology.18 i 
It is therefore proposed to establish group or 
individual incentives to reward merit and the fulfill-
ment of goals and results. However, the use of incen-
tives is seen as a necessary but not of itself sufficient 
condition for improving the performance of the 
health system: a further requisite is to develop a new 
institutional culture guided by costs, output and re-
sults, understood as improved levels of health, effi-
ciency and user satisfaction. 
purchasing and provision of health services are sepa-
rated at the internal level, and on a new financing 
model.20 The relation between financing, purchasing 
and provision of services is seen as a contractual one: 
within this framework, management contracts are the 
agency, which determines the level of prices that it can offer, ¡s 
fixed by the government. With regard to supply, in order for the 
quasi-market to be efficient it is essential that the corresponding 
suppliers should also be subject to budgetary limits (Bartlett and 
Le Grand, 1993, pp. 23-24). 
20
 The main source for the description of the proposed model is 
CCSS, Proyecto de Modernización , 1997a. 
The financing model 
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instruments which make it possible to specify health 
objectives and fix production agreements with each 
supplier centre, in order to allocate and transfer re-
sources as a function of the latter's performance and 
fulfillment of goals. In view of this, it was decided 
that the objectives must be realistic and that the in-
strument used to achieve them must be adaptable to 
changing needs and institutional development. 
In order to move the central consideration of the 
management culture from expenditure to cost, it is 
essential to identify every type of assistance provided 
to users, both as regards the financier-purchaser rela-
tion with the hospital and as regards the exchange of 
services among the various supplier centers of the 
CCSS. As we will see, this aspect is taken into account 
in the contracts. 
The financing of hospitals and the primary health 
attention level through a budget based on output, 
which provides for a maximum amount of resources 
and a predetermined quantity of services, is reflected 
in the management contract, which lays down the 
amount and type of activities which must be carried 
out 
The financing model lays down a variable budg-
etary component which makes it possible to penalize 
non-fulfillment of goals, as the availability of re-
sources depends on the objectives and goals. This 
component amounts to 10% of the total budget and is 
divided equally into two funds: 
i) the incentives fund, whose resources can be 
returned to the supplier in order to permit more 
flexible investment in items that will improve the 
quality of the services provided and to make it possi-
ble to finance monetary and non-monetary incentives 
for staff members, such as training, improvement and 
maintenance of physical plant, acquisition of minor 
equipment, maintenance of equipment, etc. This fund 
could be increased with the savings generated by 
management of the production budget, provided 
these do not run counter to the established objectives 
and that they do not exceed 80% of the total savings 
achieved; and 
ii) the solidary compensation fund, which pro-
vides a margin of protection or compensation against 
unforeseen events in budgetary execution, such as 
output which exceeds the planned level or cost in-
creases. 
The introduction of management contracts is en-
visaged as a gradual process, in view of the limited 
management capacity of the various suppliers and of 
the purchaser. In order to achieve greater manage-
ment capacity, more use should be made of profes-
sionals specializing in these activities and of an 
approach based on the execution of hybrid tasks by 
doctors, combining a clinical and preventive view in 
the field of health with knowledge of resource man-
agement. 
The need for graduality also fits in with the de-
sire to secure a parallel improvement in information 
systems, since the shortcomings in this area are very 
great: at the beginning, there was a lack of basic data 
-such as those on the number of persons attended in 
each primary level centre and their breakdown by age 
and sex- both at the level of the local management 
staff of the centres and at the central level. 
2. Specifications for the primary level of 
attention 
The objectives set must be realistic and must be in 
keeping with the health needs of the population in 
each Health Area at three levels: the budgetary level, 
that of the health objectives, and that of user satisfac-
tion. 
The model provides for three phases of innova-
tion in financial matters. In the first of these, the re-
sources corresponding to expenditure on staff costs 
plus non-personal services are allocated in accord-
ance with the past budget, but an amount of 10% for 
variable allocation is introduced. 
The resources available from the incentives fund 
and the solidary compensation fund may be allocated 
to the following areas, subject to fulfillment of the 
established commitments: minor investments in ma-
chinery and equipment, improvements in buildings, 
training, scholarships, repair of existing equipment, 
and other expenditures which improve local problem-
solving capacity. 
In the second phase, the principle of payment per 
person attended is introduced: the scales of payment 
are obtained by dividing the past fixed allocation by 
the number of inhabitants covered by the services in 
question. A fund is also set up for improving local 
problem-solving capacity, to be financed from cor-
responding reductions in the budgets of the hospitals 
and to be allocated to primary attention in accordance 
with its capacity to attract clients and reduce use of 
the hospitals. 
In the third phase, the principle of payment on a 
per capita basis will be adjusted by the relevant infant 
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TABLE 2 
Costa Rica: Values of HPUs, 1997 
Equivalence 
Relative scale of value for hospitals, in Hospital 
by type of activity Production 
Units (HPUs) 
I stay in hospital 1 
I case of emergency attention 0.35 
First visit to a specialist 0.40 
First visit to other medical staff 0.25 
Subsequent visit to a specialist 0.2 
Subsequent visit to other medical staff 0.1 
Visit toa dentist 0.1 
Visit to non-medical staff 0.05 
Source: CCSS. 
mortality rates, breakdowns by age and sex, and the 
corresponding patterns of use of the services. In order 
to strengthen the system of referrals, the primary 
level will then receive the resources previously allo-
cated for "first visits" to hospital outpatient depart-
ments, while the hospitals will bill the primary 
attention centres for the patients the latter refer to 
them. 
3. Specifications for the secondary and tertiary 
levels of attention 
Management contracts are an instrument which must 
make it possible to link activities with resources and 
lay down each hospital's objectives, responsibilities 
and incentives. In the case of the solidary compensa-
tion fund, the resources which are not used will be 
allocated to a technological renovation programme. 
Hospital performance indicators are organized 
around three groups of objectives: i) those connected 
with organization, such as recording the referrals 
made by the primary sector or developing a central-
ized system for handling waiting lists; ii) those con-
nected with medical matters or specific programmes, 
designed to solve problems such as reducing waiting 
lists or reducing the rate of caesareans, and iii) those 
connected with matters of quality, which are designed 
to improve the attention provided for users and their 
level of satisfaction. 
In the first phase of financing by output, the 
overall activities of the hospital are broken down into 
four areas: hospitalization; ambulatory attention in 
specialized and non-specialized clinics; emergency 
attention; and special programmes connected with 
medical attention, teaching and research. A standard 
unit of output is defined for the four types of activi-
ties. This standard coefficient of equivalence is 
termed the "hospital production unit" (HPU) and is 
very closely related with the length of time spent in 
hospital. The activities of the different areas are 
grouped together and weighted in a scale of relative 
values (table 2) which takes account of criteria of 
cost, planning and productivity and is made up of the 
values in HPUs. 
In this first stage, standard average lengths of 
stay in hospital are established for each type of sec-
tion or department, taking into account the serious-
ness of the cases or the case mix. This incentive 
rewards hospitals with shorter average lengths of 
stay than the standard level and serves in general to 
reduce the average length of stay. 
The HPU values are paid in accordance with a 
scale which remains invariable for the duration of the 
contract. The production budget is equivalent to the 
number of HPUs for each activity covered by the con-
tract, multiplied by the corresponding scale of pay-
ment. Payment for activities which exceed the agreed 
number of HPUs will be made in accordance with 
their marginal cost, and their source of financing 
-whether savings generated by the institution in 
question or the solidary compensation fund- varies 
according to the overall relation between the produc-
tion budget and the budget actually executed. 
It may be noted that the production function for 
the 1997 contracts was calculated on the basis of 
1994 data, and as a level of hospital output greater 
than that expected was subsequently observed, the 
scale was modified for the 1998 contracts. 
Measurement by HPUs is acknowledged to be an 
imperfect method, rather insensitive to cost variations 
and subject to corrections. It is therefore intended to 
progress towards a system of payment on the basis of 
the combination of pathologies treated. Conse-
quently, in a second phase the case mix of each hos-
pital will be taken into account in fixing service 
standards. 
In the third phase, in order to establish scales 
which are in keeping with the complex conditions of 
the hospitals, financing by HPUs will increasingly give 
way to the use of the case mix or diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs). Subsequently, the standard lengths of 
hospitalization will be defined by grouping the re-
cords of discharges and the scales will be established 
on the basis of HPUs for discharge groups with clearly 
identifiable hospitalization episodes. 
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V 
Institutional and organizational 
aspects of the contracts 
It would be useful to think of institutions as the rules 
which shape and limit human interaction by defining 
incentives applicable to political, social or economic 
exchanges (North, 1993, p. 13). Paraphrasing that 
author (ibid., pp. 116,117 and 125), the present pe-
riod in the evolution of the cess may be described as 
a situation of imbalance, in which a new institutional 
limitation -represented by the management con-
tracts- has altered the traditional structure of incen-
tives, but within the context of rules and conventions 
which are concomitant with it and continue to be 
valid, both tendencies being rooted in the action of 
actors who shape the process of institutional change. 
Various types of incentives are therefore conflicting 
with each other in this transition. And as the new 
incentives do not possess a satisfactory feedback of 
information, a suitable organizational structure or ef-
fective rules, various specific actions are necessary in 
order to advance in the desired direction. Some of 
these have already been described, and in the present 
section we will highlight those aspects connected with 
organization. As the market has been described as "a 
grab bag of institutions, some of which increase its 
efficiency while others reduce it" (North, 1993), the 
idea of a mixture is also appropriate when visualizing 
a quasi-market which is in the process of generation. 
Various individual objectives in the CCSS innova-
tion process combine to form another more global 
objective: to change the current supply of services, 
which has not arisen in response to any real strategy 
but rather in line with the capacity of each centre to 
exert pressure. Among these objectives are: to dis-
tribute the resources between primary attention and 
hospital services in a suitable and equitable manner; 
to consolidate a system of referrals which ensures 
that services are given at the level corresponding to 
their degree of complexity, in order to reduce costs; 
to improve the quality of attention in order to raise 
users' satisfaction; to reduce waiting lists; to promote 
efficiency and equity in hospital expenditure, and to 
expand the use of ambulatory procedures. 
The main idea of the reform is that although the 
CCSS has fulfilled various functions -purchaser, 
financier and supplier- these are not delineated in 
functional, structural and management terms. The 
central objective is therefore to separate and special-
ize these functions at the internal level. Management 
contracts are seen as the main instrument for achiev-
ing this separation and progressing towards the main 
objective of the financier-purchaser: namely, to maxi-
mize the amount and quality of health services pro-
vided to the population b$ making proper use- of the 
available resources. 
The CCSS currendy has a pyramidal and centralized 
structure, in which the management of investments, 
maintenance and normative planning is determined at 
the central level. The regional structures are links be-
tween the supplier centers and the central level, carry 
out instructions received from the centre, and aid in 
the directorial and management functions of the 
health establishments in their territorial area. 
It is considered that in order to transfer the risks to 
the suppliers, the supply function must be transferred 
from the central level of the cess to the hospitals and 
Health Areas, in pursuit of greater autonomy in the use 
of resources and greater responsibility for the results 
obtained. Such decentralization would mean that the 
hospitals and Health Areas would assume responsi-
bilities with regard to expenditure, goals and objec-
tives and that the benefits of greater efficiency would 
likewise be gained by the centres which increase their 
efficiency. At least initially, it is not planned to de-
centralize the purchasing function because of the re-
lated transaction costs, the low viability of this 
approach, and uncertainty about the institutional im-
provements which could be achieved in this way. 
It may be noted that there is great interest in 
decentralization in some hospitals, where it is claimed 
that the centralization of hospitals has not been a suit-
able approach, that it has led to inefficient manage-
ment21 and that it has had adverse repercussions in 
negotiations with pressure groups: whereas pre-
viously each hospital negotiated with a trade union 
which represented only its own staff, negotiations are 
now at the central level.22 
21
 Interviews with Elias Jiménez and Manrique Soto already re-
ferred to earlier. 
22
 Interview with Elias Jiménez already referred to earlier. 
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The spheres of competence of the purchaser have 
been linking up in practice. In order to evaluate the 
contracts, a special evaluation commission made up 
of the three management areas of the CCSS was set up 
and has worked smoothly with the various competent 
bodies. It should be emphasized that the evaluation 
process has been closely linked with the execution of 
the other components of contract implementation; 
that the evaluation has combined smooth and effec-
tive informal coordination within the purchasing 
body with a highly formal relationship with the sup-
plier units; and that the evaluators have had very di-
rect and prompt access to the higher authorities of the 
CCSS. Another positive aspect which is worth empha-
sizing is that the various actors involved have made 
good use of various opportunities, such as meetings 
and workshops, to negotiate, lobby and settle details 
of the contracts.23 
In the administrative division of the CCSS a "pur-
chasing group" has been set up and the negotiation 
and evaluation components have been strengthened. 
Guidance of the purchasing function in terms of plan-
ning is perhaps the weakest aspect; its development 
should be aided by the preparation of the Health Plan, 
with a high degree of participation by the Ministry. 
The data on output generated by the biomedical in-
formation section were considered as the official 
source of information in this respect after the first 
evaluation workshop of the evaluation unit. 
It may be noted that the purchasing function has 
developed unevenly; more progress has been made in 
evaluation, whereas there are more lags in the finan-
cial aspect. For example the analysis of the contrast 
between the output-based budget and the historical 
budget, which should have been carried out during 
the first year, did not take place, and there are lags in 
providing methodologies for preparing the medical 
attention protocols. The hospitals have complained 
that they lack advisory assistance and support from 
the central level, especially in informatics, and that 
the purchasing unit is slow in settling problems or 
requests which prevent them from fulfilling the con-
tracts. At the same time, however, they say that they 
have felt well represented in the contracts.24 
Interview with Rodrigo Bartels and Norma Ayala, 6 February 
1998. 
24
 Opinion expressed by Manrique Soto Pacheco al the interview 
already referred to. 
As the pilot experiment progressed, the internal 
legal basis for the reforms was also growing stronger. 
At its meeting No. 7133 on 10 June 1997, the Gov-
erning Board of the CCSS approved the conceptual 
framework of the organizational design (box 1) for 
the reform of the central level, which is to be carried 
out with the available human resources and which, in 
essence, provides for the separation of functions, con-
tractual relations through management contracts, and 
objectives and general guidelines already contained 
in the diagnosis summarized earlier. 
With regard to the new organizational structure 
of the CCSS, the Board approved option 23 , with 
certain observations by the members; as shown in 
figures 1 and 2, the Administrative Division and the 
Medical Division of the CCSS are given the essential 
attributions, but the financing function could be bet-
ter coordinated. In May 1998, however, the reassign-
ment of personnel and tasks needed to implement the 
purchasing function was still pending. 
Every quasi-market is generated in a given insti-
tutional and historical context which affects its evolu-
tion (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew, 
1996, p. 57). In the case of the CCSS, the distinction 
between functions was carried out by specializing 
them within the CCSS itself, without making outside 
bodies responsible for some of them. In this quasi-
market, the degree of concentration of the purchasing 
function is monopsonic, since no micro- or meso-pur-
chasers are established. Unlike this monopsonic 
power, the supply function is deconcentrated into a 
considerable number of bodies belonging to the CCSS, 
consisting in 1997 of seven of the 29 hospitals and 
five of the 46 Health Areas, representing altogether 
over half the CCSS budget. For 1998, management 
contracts were negotiated with 28 health service sup-
ply centres: 10 hospitals, 14 Health Areas and 4 co-
operatives. 
Place of residence is the deciding factor in the 
allocation of users to suppliers: a system which is 
also designed to optimize the system of referrals and 
counter-referrals. There is no question, therefore, of 
establishing a quasi-market which gives users the 
possibility of choosing the area or hospital where 
they wish to be treated, or choosing the doctor they 
wish to see in the allocated area or hospital. 
The purchasing and supply functions, taken to-
gether, are concentrated in the ccss!, and the funda-
mental means of control is the contract; it is precisely 
this change from hierarchical management to man-
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Box 1 
MAIN LINES OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN OF THE CCSS a 
The Costa Rican Social Security Fund is a single unitary organization responsible for providing health 
protection, treating illnesses and providing pensions under Social Security principles. 
Separation of the functions of revenue collection, financing, purchasing and supply of services. 
Establishment of a relationship between the financing/purchasing level and the provision of services, based on 
the fulfillment of management contracts. 
Empowerment of units to assume their own management with due authority and responsibility. 
Development of a form of organization oriented towards results, user satisfaction and accountability. 
Coordinated management of the health service supply centres forming part of a network. 
The process of organizational change will be carried out with the available human resources. 
Evolution towards a culture of accountability. 
Strengthening of the internal and external communication mechanisms, as a means of heightening awareness 
and publicizing the process of change. 
Use of the information systems as key elements in management planning and control. 
The new form of organization will facilitate social participation. 
Participation of the CCSS staff in the process. 
Incentives for productivity and quality. 
a
 Approved at meeting No. 7133 of the Governing Board, June 1997. 
agement by contracts which forms the essence of this 
quasi-market and, in turn, gives rise to changes in, for 
example, the systems of information and costs. This 
quasi-market is inward-oriented and is highly regu-
lated internally by the purchaser, since the central 
level has powers of regulation, establishment of rules, 
and appointment of staff to key posts. 
Because of the staff recruitment conditions and 
the rules which exist on conditions of service and 
employment stability, the central purchasing author-
ity and the supplier units themselves are still subject 
to many restrictions. The purchasing of goods and 
services has been deconcentrated, however, and some 
Health Areas are allowed to make purchases from 
third parties: a measure whose efficiency and efficacy 
has not yet been fully evaluated. 
The process also affects the formal and informal 
power relations within the units supplying services. 
In the case of the hospitals, this occurs in a context 
where the traditional autonomy of the staff has even 
led to problems of internal governance in some cases. 
In the national hospitals there are also some party 
political niches which impede joint organizational 
work.25 In this context, the directors see the contracts 
as a means for pressuring the hospitals to raise their 
performance.26 It is not easy, however, to transfer the 
responsibilities of the contract to the heads of medi-
cal departments, because of the rapidity of the 
changes, the limited existing management capacity, 
and the effect of resistance on the part of the staff. A 
task which is still outstanding in this respect is to 
strengthen the hospital directors vis-à-vis their de-
partmental heads.27 
A point raised in the joint interview with Cercone, Ayala, 
Bartels and León already mentioned earlier. 
25
 Interview with Manrique Soto already mentioned earlier. 
27
 Interview with L.B. Saenz on 26 February 1998. 
HEALTH MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN COSTA RICA FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE • ANA SOJO 
FIGURE! 
Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS): 










Other areas of 
healthcare 




• Budget follow-up 
• Human resources 
• Purchasing and 
maintenance 
Management structures 








Structures for follow-up and 
evaluation of the planning and 
purchasing function 
Regional directorates for 
branch units 









Health centres Branch units 
Source: Andersen Consulting/Consorci Hospitalari de Catalunya, by courtesy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. 
Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS): Product-oriented joint functional organizational structure 
(Basic areas of responsibility) 










^3 | Ï S 
ë § 11 
° 
• Definition of health care models 
• Strategic planning by health objectives (detection and 
ranking of health needs) 
• Budget preparation 
• Evaluation of health results 
• Catalogue of health services and content of services 
provided 
• Institutional control of registration of population covered 
• Determination and distribution of economic resources by 
territorial areas, population, type of service and levels of 
health care 
• Planning of opening of new health centres, hospitals, etc. 
• Organizational development 
• Communication of process of change 
• Strategic planning of suppliers 
• Evaluation and advisory assistance on policies for 
maintenance of centres 
• Evaluation of proposals for new technological 
investment 
• Formulation of policies for purchasing, storage 
and distribution of supplies 
• Planning of management of human resources of 
suppliers 
• Establishment of guidelines and training needs for 
health personnel, doctors and specialists 
• Planning of training of health personnel 
• Direction and technical coordination of investments 
• Establishment of standards of quality, services and health 
• Evaluation and authorization of health technologies and 
equipment 
• Planning of corporate information systems 
• Accreditation of suppliers 
• Services purchasing portfolio 
• Determination and distribution of economic 
resources by territorial areas, population, type 
of service and levels of health care 
• Preparation of contracts 
• Establishment of guidelines for budget follow-up 
• Control of flows of patients and waiting lists 
• Follow-up and evaluation of contracts and of 
degree of satisfaction with services 
• Management of economic and budgetary flows, 
both internal and with suppliers 
• Billing for services 
• Attention to users 
• Selection and termination of managers of supplier 
centres 
• Control of management of supplier centres 
* Periodical analysis, in conjunction with the 
responsible officials of the management 
structures, of the degree of fulfillment of the 
contracts and the necessary corrective policies 
• Coordination and management of health facilities 
• Technical support for the preparation of the 
strategic plans of the operational levels 
• Technical support for internal organization and 
administration of the centres 
• Technical support for the financial management of 
the centres 
• Human resources management 
• Management of purchases and maintenance 
• Management of clinical and administrative 
information systems 
• Organization and execution of training programmes 
Source: Andersen Consulting/Consorci Hospitalari de Catalunya, by courtesy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. en 
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In Chile, too, efforts are being made to advance 
in the separation of functions with management 
contracts. In this respect, the special features of the 
Chilean health system and the management reforms 
have given the National Health Fund (FONASA) an 
important role which has expanded its functions from 
those of being only a health insurance fund to the 
assumption of purchasing functions within the Minis-
try of Health system. 
In Chile, the aim is to concentrate the function of 
providing services in the area Health Services and in 
the hospitals and municipalities linked with them and 
to take away this function from the Ministry itself: 
indeed, the continued existence of the Ministry of 
Health's function as a supplier of services has been 
mentioned as a serious obstacle in the restructuring of 
the health system.28 In the context that concerns us, 
this has led to an atomized structure of contracts and 
of their evaluation. Thus, at the beginning the man-
agement contracts were prepared on the basis of pro-
posals by the various units of the Ministry, which 
also retained their authority in relation with those 
areas of the contract, so that the corresponding indi-
cators were analysed separately and finally the analy-
sis was integrated in a purely formal manner. For the 
same reason, the area Health Services had to negoti-
ate the contracts with various organs of the Ministry, 
termed "special units", which were reduced in 1996 
to two -one for the Ministry and one for FONASA-
and since 1997 to only one, since when the analysis 
of the contracts is also carried out in a coordinated 
manner.29 
It is worth noting that various political decisions 
which affect the management contracts mean that 
they are not, of themselves, a guarantee of govern-
ance within the health system: a crucial requirement 
for such governance is to strengthen the incentives 
and regulations with regard to entry into and contin-
ued presence in the system. A notable example in the 
Chilean experience is the case of a director of a de-
partment who flatly refused to sign a contract: efforts 
were made to persuade him to do so, but there was 
never any question of his dismissal.30 
28
 Interview with César Oyarzo, former Director of FONASA, 22 
August 1997. 
29
 Interview with Pedro Croco, Director of the Management Unit 
of the Ministry of Health, 3 September 1997. 
30
 Interview with César Oyarzo already referred to earlier. 
It could be said that the management reforms in 
the Costa Rican and Chilean health systems have 
been carried out from the top down, since in both 
cases the initiative came from the central authorities: 
the central level of the CCSS, and the Ministry of 
Health and FONASA, respectively. In both cases, 
however, the evaluations of the results show the im-
portance of negotiation: the results are better when 
the contracts are the result of strong rather than weak 
negotiation, that is to say, when the special local 
features and preferences are at least reflected in the 
negotiation of the targets. 
The degree of autonomy in the management of 
resources by the agencies of the CCSS, whether they 
be hospitals or Health Areas, is still limited; strictly 
speaking, what has happened is that the past budgets 
have been adopted and production functions have 
been prepared on the basis of 1994 data. However, it 
is planned to relax controls on inputs, that is to say, to 
relax the restrictions on the use of resources and their 
allocation to specific areas of expenditure: the con-
tracts contain a clause which simplifies the procedure 
required for making internal budgetary changes. Tra-
ditionally, such changes had to be approved by the 
Governing Board of the CCSS, subject to the authori-
zation of the Comptroller-General of the Republic, 
which prevented any prompt response to needs. 
The institutional morphology of the health sector 
in Costa Rica favours broad autonomy of suppliers in 
the use of resources, subject to measures to ensure 
efficiency and efficacy, because the resources do not 
come from some central body, such as the Ministry of 
Finance, but are in the hands of the institution itself 
and come from the tripartite payment of contribu-
tions. What is involved is essentially to decentralize 
the principal-agent relationship within the CCSS itself. 
In the case of Chile, this complexity is compounded 
by the rigidity of the centralized national budgetary 
system, in spite of some sectoral initiatives designed 
to facilitate the use of resources and bring in some 
flexibility by experimenting to some extent with di-
agnosis-related payments and with payment on a per 
capita basis (Sojo, 1996c, p. 144). 
In Costa Rica, both in the Health Areas and in 
the hospitals, the level and degree of involvement 
of the officials engaged in the processes leading up 
to the preparation of the management contracts and 
their periodical evaluation have been extremely 
heterogeneous. 
In the CCSS, various processes of negotiation 
have taken place. Thus, for example, meetings were 
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held with clinical groups to define the terminology, 
criteria, variables, categories and other aspects con-
nected with hospital service production, such as the 
definition of the major ambulatory surgery pro-
gramme, first visits by patients to specialists, special 
ambulatory procedures, treatment involving observa-
tion in emergency services, and the redefinition and 
relocation of the "day medicine" category and prob-
lems of standards in gynecology and obstetrics. 
Subject to the corresponding limitations -since 
each body providing services has its own special fea-
tures- the cess management contracts open up the 
way for the establishment of benchmarking of proc-
esses and results between Health Areas, on the one 
hand, and between hospitals on the other. In the areas 
where the contracts display continuity year by year, 
VI 
As we have seen, the change from hierarchical man-
agement to contract-based management is the main 
element in the construction of this quasi-market. 
Consequently, management contracts are suitable ele-
ments for reflecting the fundamental features of this 
reform, which must be considered in all its many 
dimensions. In the previous section we analysed 
some organizational aspects connected with the es-
tablishment of contracts; in the following paragraphs 
we will give a detailed description of some features 
of these instruments and the results of their first year 
of application. 
1. An overview 
In Chile, the management contracts are established 
between the central level and the area Health 
Services (tables 3,4 and 5). Because of the way the 
suppliers are made up, these bodies establish relation-
ships with the public hospitals and the municipalities 
and promote the signing of contracts with them. Al-
though the indicators of the Chilean management 
contracts cover all three levels of attention there is 
greater emphasis on primary and preventive attention. 
In Costa Rica, the CCSS management contracts 
(tables 6 and 7) are specifically for the Health Areas 
and for the secondary and tertiary levels of attention. 
obviously the different results obtained in the con-
tracts should make it possible for individual suppliers 
to establish benchmarks among themselves (even 
though they will not be fully comparable), for modi-
fying the measurements of performance and making 
individual goals and objectives more specific or 
stricter, according to the progress made. The inclu-
sion of clinics run by cooperatives will also be inter-
esting for judging their specific performance and 
comparing it with that of clinics which belong to the 
cess. 
In the medium term, the experience with con-
tracts should make it possible to draw lessons regard-
ing better management practices which may usefully 
be applied on a more general scale for the reform of 
the State. 
The contracts (both with the Health Areas and with 
the hospitals) were initially established from 1 Janu-
ary 1997 to 30 June of the same year and were sub-
sequently renewed up to 31 December 1997. The 
good level of fulfillment displayed by the Health Ar-
eas led to the establishment of new goals and objec-
tives when their contracts were renewed for the 
second half year, whereas the delays of the hospitals 
in fulfilling their commitments (except in the case of 
the Children's Hospital) caused the deadline for ful-
filling the initially agreed goals and objectives to be 
extended to 31 December. 
Within the different varieties of the so-called 
new public management, a distinction may be drawn 
between models in which the processes are just as 
important as the organizational results, and others 
which are centered more closely on the tasks to be 
carried out (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Petti-
grew, 1996, p. 14). The measurement of the fulfill-
ment of the cess contracts clearly takes the broader 
view, which goes beyond the mere use of indicators 
31
 The empirical bases for the analysis and interpretation pre-
sented in this section were the protocols of the CCSS manage-
ment contracts and their six -monthly and yearly evaluations, 
and the protocols of the management contracts of the Ministry of 
Health of Chile and their annual evaluations. 
The 1997 management contracts 
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TABLE 3 
Chile: Management contracts with the area Health Services, 1995 
Indicators Emphasis on health 
objectives 
Emphasis on management 
and quality 
Formulation of a health plan for 1996 
Coverage of preventive health examinations for the working population 
Perinatal mortality rate 
Number of communes with vaccination coverage under 90% 
Number of specific buco-dental preventive health activities carried out in 
the total for children of 0-5 and 6-9 years of age 
Incidence of malnutrition among the child population 
Instances of internal or community participation and intersectoral cooperation 
in functioning of Health Services and establishments as at the end of 1995 
Operating theatre hours used/operating theatre hours available 
Source: Official documents. 
of efficiency or efficacy, although obviously these are 
used too. 
Thus, in the broad range of components of the 
CCSS management contracts -including their so-
called additional clauses- there are the aims of intro-
ducing or improving certain information systems, 
making processes which had not been functioning 
properly work and optimizing those which had not 
been working well, or developing new processes 
which make it possible to gain a fuller knowledge of 
the provision of services, put them on a systematic 
basis, and clarify specific aspects of their efficacy. An 
analysis of the indicators relating to these aspects 
shows their great importance both in the Health Ar-
eas and in the hospitals, at least in quantitative terms. 
Some components, such as the clinical protocols, 
can help in themselves to further the institutional 
restructuring, since they involve corresponding 
changes in working processes. These complementary 
aspects of the contracts would therefore appear to be 
at least as important as increases in the indexes of 
activity and results in the field of health, which are 
aspects that are obviously also reflected, for example, 
in the objectives of reducing waiting lists. 
Introducing clinical protocols involves technical 
requirements and agreements on how to record the 
procedures, with a view to their standardization. In 
political terms, this has been a complex task which 
has met with resistance on the part of doctors32 or has 
caused doctors to associate the protocols in their 
minds with clinical training and progress towards ex-
cellence, rather than appreciating their importance for 
management. The central level has not yet estab-
lished methodologies for the preparation of protocols, 
as was planned, but has embarked upon the study of 
this matter.33 
The organizational processes have not been 
given such an important role in the case of Chile, 
where the contracts do in fact display some weak-
nesses in terms of the integration of management as-
pects in the strict sense. In 1995, the indicators in the 
contracts which were of a strictly management-ori-
ented nature were few in number. Although they 
were given greater prominence in the following two 
years, in 1997 the main emphasis was still on the 
execution of particular health actions connected with 
indexes of activity (tables 4, 5 and 6); in terms of 
management, the main items that were noteworthy in 
1997 were the activities connected with the reduction 
of waiting lists. The improvement of records as a 
means of strengthening management capacity has not 
been taken into account in these contracts. 
In Chile, progress has been made in improving 
the health indicators of the management contracts, 
which were very weak to start with, and in linking up 
with ministerial and governmental objectives, espe-
cially since 1998. In this respect, over the course of 
time the goals and objectives have gradually been 
made more precise and clearly structured. Their exe-
cution, however, which strictly speaking forms the 
32
 Interview with Manrique Soto, already referred to earlier. 33 Interview with L.B. Saenz, already referred to earlier. 
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TABLE 4 
Chile: Management contracts with the area Health Services, 1996 
(Indicators of activity, by areas) 
Health management Organizational development and 
management of service Quality of attention 
Coverage of immunization programme 
Implementation of plan of action for 
attention to the integral psycho-social 
development of children under six 
Coverage of the preventive health 
examinations for adults 
Medico-social evaluation of the elderly 
Design and implementation of a plan of 
work to prevent adolescent pregnancies 
in the poorest communes 
Coverage of Papanicolau tests for female 
beneficiaries between 25 and 64 
Detection of cases of tuberculosis 
Perinatal mortality 
Health plan 
Diagnosis of efficiency of specialist 
clinics 
Efficiency in use of operating theatres 
Budgetary management of investments 
Operational results 
Maintenance plan 
Use of equipment and infrastructure 
Reduction of levels of absenteeism on 
account of sick leave 
Measurement of expenditure on remunerations 
Participative management: 
Support for municipal management 
Internal participation in regular organs 
Social participation 
Quality management 
Reduction of intra-hospital 
infections 
Index of cesareans as a proportion of 
deliveries in type I and II hospitals 
Source: Official documents. 
core of management, has basically been left to the 
free choice of the area Health Services, since this 
aspect has not been fully incorporated into the con-
tracts and in the present conditions the monitoring of 
its progress might be viewed by the Directors of the 
Services as undue interference. Discussions on health 
in the country have fundamentally revolved around 
the policy lines and only marginally around the ques-
tion of management; when certain adjustments are 
agreed with the Directors of the Services in order to 
solve financing problems (generally connected with 
remuneration), no effort is made to take advantage of 
the agreed adjustment to request measures at the 
management level whose fulfillment can actually be 
verified.34 
34
 This aspect of the contracts was noted by Rony Lenz, the 
Director of FONASA, in an interview on 26 May 1998. His 
references to the weakness of the contracts in terms of manage-
ment was in response to our critical opinions on this matter, with 
which he fully agreed. 
In Chile, the introduction of diagnosis-related 
payment has come up against some limitations. This 
form of financing has not taken the place of the tradi-
tional allocation by budget, but has been introduced 
in a parallel manner on an experimental basis. It was 
introduced with a high degree of participation at the 
hospital level, and was therefore not seen as a threat, 
but it collapsed when an attempt was made to apply it 
generally, because the diversity of initial conditions 
and information made it inviable. Its use has there-
fore been concentrated on specific items such as 
complex treatments and the timeliness of attention, 
but even so some progress has been made, because 
the idea of a "package" of services is no longer a 
concept that gives rise to resistance, and the authori-
ties no longer think solely in terms of isolated serv-
ices.35 Experiences like this highlight the need to 
35
 These developments with regard to diagnosis-related pay-
ments were mentioned to us by Rony Lenz at the interview re-
ferred to above. 
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TABLE 5 
Chile: Lines of emphasis and indicators of management 
contracts with the area Health Services, 1997 
Field of management Indicators 
Emphasis Emphasis on 
on health management 









Coverage of adult preventive health examinations 
Preventive dental attention for children 
Detection of tuberculosis cases 
Coverage of Papanicolau testing 
Chronic medication under primary health attention 
High blood pressure 
Pattern of accreditation of primary health attention 
Monthly average number of hours contracted for heads of basic 
programmes 
Modernization projects (article 10 of the protocol) 
Programme on timeliness of attention (article 11 of the protocol) 
Rights of beneficiaries under Law No. 18.469 (article 12 of the 
protocol) 
Reduction of waiting time 
Percentage of hospitals with daily visits 
Percentage of hospitals with parental care of hospitalized children 
Percentage of hospitals with facilities for care of terminal patients 
Percentage of hospitals where the father can be present at delivery 
Development Committee 
Billing of health services (article 13 of the protocol) 
Indebtedness 
Operating results 
Absenteeism for sick leave 
Performance as a function of expenditure on remunerations 
Management contracts between the area Health Services and the 
establishments under their jurisdiction (article 7 of the protocol) 
Use of operating theatre 
Biological and environmental monitoring of enterprises subject to 
such control (implementation of O.S. 745) 
Water quality 
Food poisoning 
Source: Chile, Ministry of Health (1997b). The fields in question are defined in the contracts. 
consolidate the management area in the modern-
ization of the Chilean health sector, either through 
contracts with the area Health Services, or in other 
ways. In the area of diagnosis-related payments, pro-
gress could be made from the point of view of man-
agement with the support of processes such as the 
application of clinical protocols. 
The cess contracts, for their part, establish infor-
mation systems at a number of levels which should 
make it possible for both the financier-purchaser and 
the supplier to know how services are actually being 
provided and to have the necessary items of informa-
tion to make a diagnosis on the efficiency and effi-
cacy of resource use, to modify the corresponding 
processes of management and services, and to pre-
pare some indicators of efficiency and efficacy. This 
range of objectives is behind a number of the addi-
tional clauses in the CCSS contracts, in which the de-
velopment of reliable records on activities, costs and 
quality occupies a leading place. 
Outstanding examples in these terms are the at-
tention and treatment protocols, which should make it 
possible to gain a knowledge of the processes in-
volved in clinical management; this area has tradi-
tionally been a "black box" in which doctors acted 
without any restrictions. The protocols make it possi-
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ble to modify this degree of autonomy in working 
practices and should make it possible to scrutinize the 
way services are provided in order to determine their 
technical, clinical and management efficiency; to in-
dividualize the processes involved in order to pro-
gress towards the establishment of cost centres for 
services provided and begin the application of a sys-
tem of payment by diagnosis-related groups; to de-
fine the responsibilities of staff members and teams 
in the provision of services, in order to improve qual-
ity and verify performance, and finally, to make ad-
justments in clinical behaviour. 
Mention has been made in this respect, for exam-
ple, of the need to formalize operational guidelines 
and procedures through protocols, in order to ensure 
continuity of attention to individual patients, seen as 
entities who exist over time and have morbidity his-
tories which do not consist of discrete episodes of 
sickness and should not be dealt with through occa-
sional and fragmentary meetings with different pro-
fessionals. The "organizational principle" is a form of 
management of sickness which improves the continu-
ity of attention and reduces the use of unsuitable 
treatments: it is considered that every illness has a 
life cycle and an economic structure, and the use of 
protocols of attention is aimed at forestalling expen-
sive episodes of specific diseases, such as diabetes, 
and improving the quality of the attention given by 
making the patient the centre of the process (Bengoa, 
1997, pp. 37 and 38). 
The CCSS contracts incorporate elements de-
signed to improve the organization of the health sys-
tem and the provision of services, particularly as 
regards the interaction of the three levels of attention 
in the system of referrals and counter-referrals: the 
system of referrals is strengthened by rewarding the 
capacity of the Health Areas to settle their own prob-
lems and reduce the number of referrals, while as 
regards the hospitals, the system of referrals is regu-
lated and, in some cases, specific mention is made of 
a hospital network which needs to be consolidated. 
This would have positive effects on the efficacy and 
efficiency, coverage and quality of attention (for ex-
ample, treating diabetic patients whose condition is 
now stable at less complex levels). 
In the Health Areas, the contracts are designed to 
encourage preventive and health promotion actions at 
the primary level, which will make it possible in the 
medium and long term to reduce morbidity and mor-
tality and consolidate desirable health conditions 
through suitable pre-natal attention; by following up 
children's development; through early detection of 
illnesses such as cervical cancer, and through the de-
tection and control of priority chronic diseases such 
as diabetes and high blood pressure. For the Health 
Areas, integral standards of attention were prepared 
for the primary level which form the frame of refer-
ence for evaluating its performance. 
The consolidation of the system of referrals, with 
its beneficial effects in terms of the gradual reduction 
of waiting lines in outpatient and speciality clinics, 
also depends on advances in other areas of reform of 
the health sector: namely, the consolidation of the 
Basic Integral Health Attention Teams.36 
Interest has recently been displayed in Chile, too, 
in optimizing the system of the supply of services 
through the use of management contracts, since pre-
viously the links were only between the central level 
and the individual Health Services. To this end, 
FONASA has become an intermediary between the 
area Health Services, which have been reorganized 
into five zones each covering several such Services, 
in order to link together the network in the regions. 
Special "regional units" have been set up to follow up 
the contracts.37 
Improvement of the quality of attention, seen as 
an ongoing process, occupies an important place in 
the CCSS contracts. The measurement of quality is 
reflected in indicators concerning the efficacy of 
medical treatments (complications in patients' health, 
evolution and causes of mortality, etc.) or in proce-
dures for ensuring proper use of medicines, improv-
ing individual health records or controlling 
intra-hospital infections (tables 6 and 7). The concern 
to raise the levels of quality is also behind measures 
connected with the timeliness of attention and access 
to it (reduction of waiting lists, solution of emergen-
cies, and improvement of the efficiency of support 
services such as pharmacies). In the area of quality, 
the contracts include measures designed to identify 
staff processes and responsibilities, such as protocols 
for washing hands in hospitals. The underlying idea 
is that the achievement of higher quality can be de-
tected and measured in the processes conditioning it. 
J 6
 For a detailed analysis on these teams, see Costa Rica, 
M1DEPLAN, 1998, pp. 195-200. 
7
 Interview with Rony Lenz, already referred to earlier. 
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TABLE 6 
Costa Rica: Management contracts between the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS) and the hospitals, 1997 
(O 
Fields Indicators of information system and processes Indicators of efficiency Indicators of efficacy Objectives Related activities 
External Centralized system of appointments for 
consultations admission (automated or manual) 
Centralized machinery for waiting lists for 
specialities (automated or manual) 
Records of diagnoses and treatments made 
by each service 
System of records of pathologies 
Records of procedures 
Rate of occupation of 
external consultations 
Situation with regard to 
waiting lists 
Mortality rate of patients 
treated in multidisci-
plinary clinics 
Reduction of waiting lists, 
fixing a desired percent-
age and establishing 
maximum waiting 
times 
Hospital New hospital discharge sheet 
services Records of readmissions 
Monthly records of rate of cancellation of 
planned surgical operations, with reasons 
Records of obstetric attention 
Records of activities 
Protocol for washing hands in all departments 
Protocol for detection and control of intra-hospital 
carriers of infectious diseases 
Records of obstetric and pediatric attention and 
complications in such attention 
Waiting times for surgical 
operations and related 




Lengths of stay in 
multidisciplinary clinics 
Rate of readmissions, 
by pathologies and 
departments 
Mortality rate of children 
Complications in mother 
and child area 
Complications in different 
patients in multidisci-
plinary clinics 
Mortality rate of patients 
treated in multidisci-
plinary clinics 
Rate of cancellation of 
planned surgical 
operations 
Rate of post-delivery 
and post-cesarean 
complications 
Prevention and control of 
intra-hospital infections 
Quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of 
complications in the 
mother and child health 
area, by pathology, age 
and period 
Designation of staff to be 
responsible for coordina-
tion of the respective 
activities 
Training in prevention and 
control of intra-hospital 
infections 
Detection and control of 
intra-hospital carriers 
of infectious diseases 
System of Records of referrals from the primary and secondary 
referrals levels and areas of attraction, in order to identify 
patients- Records include territorial location, 
reasons, or diagnosis for the referrals 
Validity of systems of referrals and counter-referrals 
Tripartite report (by the "Grecia", "Monseñor 
Sanabria" and "México" hospitals) to the 
Financier-Purchaser on pathologies which must 
be dealt with at other levels of the system 
TABLE 6 (concluded) 
Fields Indicators of information system and processes Indicators of efficiency Indicators of efficacy Objectives Related activities 
Human Records of number of days of sick leave by 
Resources CCSS staff and by the population in general 
Introduction of a system of 
control and evaluation 
of amount of sick leave 
Reduction of number of 
days of sick leave (%) 
Percentage of upper 
management staff 
trained in management 
Quality and Surveys of degree ofsatisfaction of outside users 
attention to Receipt of written complaints made by users, 
users with a maximum response time of 10 days 
Qualitative analysis of 
users' complaints 
Establishment of a user-
oriented programme of 
continuous improvement 
of attention 
Support Records of issue of medicines 
services Report on use of medicines 
Suitable times of issue 
Proper use of medicines 
Programmes of instruction 
of patients 
Systems to avoid over-issue 
of medicines 
Consolidation of "satellite" 
pharmacies 
Clinical Protocols of attention 
attention Protocols of treatment 
Establishment of commiitccs 
on protocols of attention 
and treaiment 
Preparation of reports on 
protocols of activities 




Costa Rica: Management contracts between the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS) and the Health Areas, 1997 
Field Indicators of information system and processes Indicators of efficacy Related activities 
Activities Coverage of consultation: first-time consultations/registered population 
effected Concentration of consultations: first-time consultations/total consultations in 
the period 
Emergency treatments per inhabitant: number of emergency treatments/total 
number of inhabitants 
Emergency ratio: total number of emergencies dealt with/total number of 
consultations 
Records of daily workload of vaccinations 
Profile of Updated population pyramid 
beneficiaries Updated analysis of health situation 
Updated family profile of population 
Percentage of dwellings, by risk: number of dwellings by risk/total number 
of dwellings 
Concentration of home visits by risk: number of home visits by risk/number 
of dwellings by risk 
Nutritional state of children under 6, based on weight/age table 
Insured status, on the basis of family status card 
Access of the Plan for promotion of healthy lifestyles 
registered Plan tor control and treatment of at least two prevalent transmissible disease 
population problems: malaria and AIDS 
Objectives by programmes: 
a) Children 
Coverage of growth and development of children from 0 to 6 years of age 
Vaccination coverage {basic scheme) 
b) Adolescents 
Coverage of sexual and reproductive health counselling 
c> Women 
Coverage of prenatal attention in the period (includes controls outside the 
area of attraction) 
Registration of pregnant women, with or without controls 
Coverage of detection of cervical cancer, by age groups 
d) Adults 
Number of persons with high blood pressure identified in supplier unit 
Coverage of persons with high blood pressure identified in controls 
Number of diabetics identified 
Coverage of diabetics in controls 
e) The elderly 
Coverage of persons classified as being at risk 
TABLE 7 (concluded) 
Field Indicators of information system and processes Indicators of efficacy Related activities 
Strengthening 





attention to users 
Fulfillment of referrals to a given hospital 
Preparation of proposals on the interlinking of health establishments and 
levels of attention 
Coordination with other actors in the area in pursuit of integral attention 
Receipt of counter-referrals from the area 
Recording of cases referred to other levels of attention 
Activities generated by the Health Area at the following levels of anention: 
Records of requests for X-rays 
Records of requests for laboratory tests 
Records of prescriptions requested 
Individual health records 
Complete clinical history and physical examination, with identification 
sheet 
Records of attention given to patient (clinical records in health or 
other record) 
Solution of emergencies: 
total number of emergencies 
referred to another level 
of attention/total number 
of emergencies attended 
Percentage of referrals: 
total number of referrals/total 
number of consultations 
A system for receiving users' 
complaints and suggestions 
A continuous quality improvement team which 
analyses and initiates a plan for providing 
solutions in at least two critical areas of 
health services 
A commission to analyse deaths of mothers 
or children and investigate each case 
A mechanism to control the quality of the 
individual health records, with at least 
the following requisites: existence of a 
responsible person or group and evaluation of 
at least one representative sample of health 
records during the period of the contract 
A readily accessible place for the reception 
of complaints and suggestions; existence of 
a staff member or group to deal with, answer 
and settle complaints; generation of a list of 
leading problems and plans for solving them 
Application of the instrument on user satisfac-
tion put forward by the financier-purchaser 
Information for users on the services 
provided by the centre 
Human resources Updated records of the staff, by categories 
Records of staff sick leave, by categories 
Strengthening of Gradual development of accounting records different from those tradiiionally 
cost centres used, with the advisory assistance of the financier-purchaser 
Timely submission of financial and accounting data 
Source: Prepared and classified by the author on the basis of official documents. 
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To paraphrase Hirschman, since this reform can-
not be based on the danger that the client may "walk 
out of the shop", the "users' voice" is taken as the 
source of feedback. In order to secure this feedback, 
systems are established which make it possible to de-
termine both the main faults observed in clinical at-
tention and the degree of satisfaction of users, and 
procedures for dealing with complaints are laid down. 
The concern to find out the opinions of users 
also led to the execution in 1997 of an "Opinion Sur-
vey on the CCSS Health Services" which examined 
the services provided by that organization in each 
region of the country (EYMSA, Statistics and Market-
ing, 1997). On a scale from 1 to 10, the services 
received an average rating of 8.2, which was consid-
ered good. The service with the best rating was hos-
pitalization, with an average of 8.6, and second place 
was occupied by the Basic Integral Health Attention 
Teams, with an average of 8.4; both the medical and 
the para-medical staff were also given good ratings. 
The survey brought out some common bottle-
necks, however: the aspects considered to represent a 
serious situation in very varied areas of the country, 
with ratings of less than 7 points -issue of appoint-
ments, hours of attention, rapidity of attention, time 
needed for the supply of medicines- mainly concern 
the timeliness of attention, and the ratings are lowest 
with regard to support services. The survey did not 
include any questions providing indications of the ef-
ficacy of the services provided, such as complications 
in recovery from sickness. 
The contracts in Chile and Costa Rica share 
some common objectives, such as the reduction of 
waiting lists for specialist attention, better use of in-
stalled capacity -for example, of operating theatres-
and reduction of absenteeism among doctors. Signifi-
cantly reducing such absenteeism is one of the most 
difficult objectives to achieve, however, if the means 
used is exclusively or primarily the management con-
tracts, without any substantial changes in forms of 
hiring and remuneration of staff (Sojo, 1996c). 
Thus, the reduction in rates of absenteeism for 
sick leave in Chile in 1996 -the first year in which 
contracts were used- was only significant in some of 
the area Health Services; in other Services the rates 
even rose. The next year the same thing happened, 
and the reductions were only of a minor level, as was 
to be expected; furthermore, the reductions have not 
always been maintained in the individual services. 
Finally, it is worth noting that in the 1997 con-
tracts of the CCSS the Single Incentive Fund was al-
most inoperative in the case of hospitals, since no 
provision had been made for the necessary separation 
of funds; in 1998, however, this separation was ef-
fected, and as from January 0.5% of the budget was 
set aside for this purpose, in order to reach a total of 
10% in the year. The Health Areas, in contrast, did 
receive between 2% and 4% from the incentives fund 
in 1997.38 
2. Performance of the Health Areas 
The evaluation of the additional clauses of the con-
tracts takes account of important contextual aspects 
of an organizational nature which help in under-
standing their results. Among these aspects are the 
nature of the staff assigned as counterparts and their 
attitude to change; the degree of knowledge of the 
heads of services and the evaluation team regarding 
the contracts; the forms of organization of work -for 
example, internal coordination of services or their at-
omization- and the use of information throughout the 
process. Big contrasts have been found in this re-
spect: as in the case of the hospitals, there are short-
comings in the dissemination of the objectives and 
advances of the contracts and in the commitment of 
the staff to innovation. It has also been noted how 
important it is to appoint persons to be personally 
responsible for the execution of the procedures or 
tasks included in the contract. 
With regard to organizational aspects, the evalu-
ation notes a high degree of commitment and respon-
sibility on the part of the support team and the 
members of the Basic Integral Health Attention 
Teams, both in the achievement of the objectives and 
in making proposals for their fulfillment. Progress 
was made in the course of the year in overcoming 
resistance to change, teams for ongoing quality im-
provement were formed and trained, all the directors 
and managers were trained in management matters, 
and healthy lifestyle programmes were implemented, 
aimed at the population of all the Health Areas. The 
evaluation considers that in order to motivate the 
doctors and secure their active participation there 
must be closer communication between the directors 
and the support team for the contracts. 
An improvement was observed in the level of 
management over the year thanks to the training 
processes. Moreover, the strengthening of the evalu-
Interview with Rodrigo Bartels. 
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ation process has enabled it to be used also as a man-
agement tool. 
Naturally, some Health Areas show greater pro-
gress than others in fulfilling the contracts. However, 
the annual evaluation shows that all of them except 
one complied with the obligatory clauses. With re-
gard to the quality clauses, their degree of fulfillment 
was satisfactory and this meant that there was partial 
compliance with the integral attention clause, whose 
coverage was linked with quality criteria. The records 
made it possible to collect and verify a great deal of 
information in the Health Areas, and the information 
system is gradually being consolidated. 
The evaluation expresses some concern over the 
quality of the medical files, since a considerable 
number of shortcomings were/observed which 
seemed to indicate some lack of collaboration on the 
medical side. Even so, however, there has been pro-
gress at this level, and a noteworthy advance has 
been registered in the application of the established 
criteria and an improvement in the quality of the 
services provided by the Basic Integral Health Atten-
tion Teams, with the introduction of pre-consultations 
and an increase in preventive measures which has 
warranted congratulations from some communities. 
With regard to quality, mechanisms have been 
established for the receipt of complaints and sugges-
tions and groups responsible for investigating the 
cases and preparing replies have been set up; the 
local commissions to analyse infant mortality have 
continued the work already begun; The question of 
quality has been incorporated into (he direct attention 
level through coverage evaluation criteria, and the 
recording and analysis of information has been pro-
moted as an instrument for improving management. 
The teams say that they feel more consolidated as 
such, with common goals and concern for the quality 
of processes. The staff has been trained and educated 
in improvement of quality and attention to clients. At 
the same time, management weaknesses have been 
identified which require advisory assistance assigned 
by the central level. 
In the same field, quality criteria were incorpo-
rated in the second half of 1997 in the services pro-
vided by the Health Areas, in accordance with the 
rules on integral attention for each one of the objec-
tives of the contracts. Although it was decided not to 
take this aspect into account when evaluating fulfill-
ment, very serious work was carried out on it and this 
made it possible to identify the weaknesses that 
needed to be corrected and served as a basis for im-
proving the 1998 contracts, which officially included 
criteria on service quality.39 
The Health Areas registered a positive response 
to the incentives applied during the first half of the 
year; this was so, for example, in the case of the 
Pacific Central region. 
The system of record cards traditionally used at 
the primary level of attention in the country had not 
been very strictly applied in the past. As already 
noted, when the reform began there was a lack even 
of basic data such as the population attended in each 
primary level centre and its breakdown by age and 
sex. In this sense, the contracts with the Health Areas 
can also be useful in general for selective social poli-
cies of an individual and geographical nature, since 
the contracts require the individual identification of 
all the beneficiaries of the services provided by the 
Health Areas and the preparation of an economic and 
social profile which makes it possible to establish 
what the population at risk is. The cards contain in-
formation on the geographical location and charac-
teristics of the dwelling, sanitation, and the sex, age, 
schooling, place of work, insurance status, vital facts, 
vaccination records and health situation of the per-
sons making up the family nucleus. 
3. The performance of the hospitals 
In some hospitals the introduction of the contracts 
was preceded by administrative reform measures. 
With regard to the additional clauses of the contracts, 
the annual evaluation notes that the main achieve-
ments of the hospitals included the reduction of wait-
ing time and waiting lists in all the centres, both in 
support services and in outpatient departments, emer-
gency departments and hospitalization. 
The evaluation also registers better performance 
as regards the provision of final services in these ar-
eas. The advances made in service to the client vary 
from one hospital to another, but they cover a broad 
spectrum: internal remodelling of waiting rooms for 
internal and external users; talks directed to internal 
users on matters related with the quality of attention 
to clients; re-ordering of the hours of attention for the 
public in laboratory and pharmacy services; improve-
ments in the equipment of support services; introduc-
Views expressed by Norma Ayala. 
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tion of new types of facilities to satisfy the needs of 
special population groups in the area of attraction, 
and optimization of the use of operating theatres and 
various services. 
The achievements also vary from one hospital to 
another with regard to organizational aspects and work-
ing processes. The evaluation highlights the formation 
of working teams which have promoted the real partici-
pation of workers in the improvement of everyday proc-
esses; the formation of support teams for the reform 
process in all centres; the use of information analysis for 
taking decisions; the development of automated sys-
tems in some centres; the establishment of opera-
tional and technical rules and controls for evaluating 
working processes; better knowledge of the occupa-
tional profile of staff members; standardization of 
working processes, and improvement of records. 
With regard to quality, user satisfaction surveys 
were carried out which made it possible to find out 
users' needs; teams were formed for the ongoing im-
provement of quality; medical protocols were de-
signed in all hospitals; intra-hospital infections were 
controlled and reduced, and complaints and sugges-
tions offices were set up, with special groups respon-
sible for solving complaints and giving answers. 
Also at the organizational level, plans and strate-
gies have been prepared for internal and external 
communication; mass communication media have been 
used, such as notice boards, sound and newsletters 
for informing users about the prevention of infections 
and health education, and the communication be-
tween chiefs and subordinates has been improved. 
The efforts to measure hospital output made under 
the terms of the 1997 contracts, however, showed that 
many unsatisfied requirements prevented satisfactory 
measurement, so that the output analysis model took on 
an experimental nature. The evaluation also noted that 
the model must be adjusted in order to attain the degree 
of reliability required in order to establish relations of an 
economic nature between production and financing and 
in order to make a proper comparison of the production 
of the different hospital centres. The annual evaluation 
report has therefore simply given a brief account of 
aggregate production by activities and has not sought 
to establish such relations or to effect comparisons 
between the hospitals concerned.40 
40
 The hospitals which took part were the Calderón Guardia, the 
México, the Monseñor Sanabria, the National Children's Hospi-
tal, the San Juan de Dios, the San Francisco de Asís and the 
William Allen. 
The half-yearly report had already been categori-
cal in these terms: "on the basis of the present pro-
duction information it has not been possible to 
establish a budget based on production in any of the 
hospitals". The annual report is more cautious: the 
production data are presented as provisional and sub-
ject to revision at the request of the centres them-
selves or the central level. 
The evaluation considers that the relative values 
of the model must be adapted, since their standards 
are strictly empirical and were assumed on the basis 
of past operations, which is precisely what the 
authorities are seeking to change. It also asserts that 
the methods of analysis must be improved and that 
the measurements do not therefore reflect the true 
activities of the centres. 
With regard to the records of activities, the main 
obstacles detected for measuring production are: lack 
of verification, backing up and validation of the data; 
information which is not in line with the desired 
measurement of objectives because it was not pro-
vided in a timely manner; dissimilar criteria for the 
recording, consolidation and format of information, 
and differences between the reports prepared to pro-
vide information to the central level. As we can see, 
the shortcomings are related both with the quality of 
the information and traditional management prac-
tices, and with the fact that the contracts accepted the 
heterogeneity of the information and records. In order 
to overcome this heterogeneity, the authorities are 
working on a national information system which, us-
ing a common information processing platform, will 
make it possible to secure compatibility between the 
systems used in each of the hospitals. 
The problems of information referred to clearly 
show, in the case of Costa Rica, a problem which has 
already been highlighted with respect to the develop-
ment of quasi-markets in general: namely, the need to 
overcome asymmetries of information between the 
purchaser and the supplier and, ultimately, to estab-
lish incentives for suppliers to facilitate or provide 
the necessary information. The purchaser would thus 
be protected from possible opportunistic behaviour 
by suppliers and would have better background infor-
mation for establishing the contracts (Bartlett and Le 
Grand, 1993, p. 209). 
In the cess, the main safeguard adopted in this 
respect, both for the hospitals and the Health Areas, 
has been to establish that "anything that is not re-
corded will be assumed not to exist": in the 1998 
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contracts, information is deemed to be the key for 
obtaining funds. As the information can be manipu-
lated, however, its veracity may be called into 
question. In 1997, for example, it was discovered 
that there was an excessive increase in "first consult-
ations" compared with subsequent consultations, 
which was considered to be due to the greater weight 
given to such consultations in terms of HPUs. 
The effort to measure production has brought to 
light veritable traditions in institutional culture. For 
example, only the recording of discharges from hos-
pital, which is deeply rooted in established practice, 
is free from the shortcomings in question. In contrast, 
in the areas of outpatient attention or emergency at-
tention, the information is neither validated nor veri-
fied. This confirms that "informal culturally derived 
limitations will not change immediately in response 
to changes in the formal rules" (North, 1993, p. 65). 
The 1997 evaluation considers that there are 
problems connected with the failure of the measure-
ment model to define some concepts properly, as in 
the vague definition and lack of precision of some 
categories such as special procedures (where the di-
versity of criteria led to serious discrepancies in 
measurement) or the final products. 
In the discussion on hospital output and services, 
hospital directors have referred to the existence of 
technical difficulties for measuring, with the avail-
able information, the attention provided in respect of 
emergency cases, minor surgery and surgical proce-
dures; the need to establish detailed rules regarding 
the respective systems of measurement and to follow 
The "screen", a practice which combines medical 
corruption and a perverse form of medical selection 
by patients who are willing to pay for it or forced to 
do so, is an illegal action which consists of the doctor 
charging the CCSS beneficiary for the treatment 
(mainly surgical operations) given in public facilities. 
It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the 
contracts have provided indications that may help to 
reveal and quantify these practices. In 1997, for 
example, it was found in one hospital that 35% of 
the high-cost operations were supposed to have origi-
the international classification of diseases in the case 
of the clinical files; and the need to specify what is 
meant by readmittance to hospital and to state the 
possible causes.41 In other cases, it has been suggested 
that the measurement of hospital output is viable when 
a proper selection is made of a few actions which ade-
quately reflect production, so that it would be desirable 
to take account of only a few special procedures.42 
Finally, the evaluation concludes that the meas-
urement of hospital output does not permit suitable 
comparison of the results or provide the necessary 
information for prospective budgetary allocation. Af-
ter having noted all these points, however, it states 
that "according to the agreed objectives, the estab-
lished rules and the method applied, the hospitals 
with management contracts nevertheless fulfilled 
what was required of them". Indeed, taking the hospi-
tal production units as a whole, the unit with the 
highest degree of fulfillment achieved a level of 
136% of its goal, while the unit with the lowest de-
gree of fulfillment nevertheless registered 97%. 
When we analysed the respective tables of our 
own accord, we noted that in most of the hospitals 
there are discrepancies between the agreed HPUs and 
those actually effected in specific activities, but the 
differences are very varied and, generally speaking, 
the deficits in some activities are offset by the sur-
pluses in others. The relation between deficit and sur-
plus activities varies from one unit to another, and 
comparison of the various units does not show any 
significant tendency in terms of activities which pre-
dominantly registered deficits or surpluses. 
nated in the emergency department, where however 
they were not registered. 
We have brought this matter up at this point 
because, at all events, the far-reaching measures 
required for doing away with the "screen" have im-
plications for the rules of the game in more general 
terms. The permanent nature of staff members' 
contracts, regardless of their performance, a career 
Interview with Dr. Manrique Soto, already referred to earlier. 
Interview with Elias Jiménez, already referred to earlier. 
VII 
Are the reforms in danger? 
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structure which depends on seniority and not on 
merit, the stipulation that staff must attend 4 to 5 
patients per hour, the tortuous nature of the proce-
dures for securing a staff member's dismissal,43 and 
the inability of patients to make any medical choice 
for themselves form a strait-jacket which makes it 
impossible to change this situation to any major 
extent and, in general, impedes the modernization 
of human resources management in the CCSS. 
Inflexibility of hiring conditions is undoubtedly 
a crucial element which can impede management in-
novations. In Chile, the interested sectors have so far 
managed, by militant action, to prevent the amend-
ment of law No. 15076 governing the hiring and re-
muneration of professional health service staff. Thus, 
a novel Bill was presented in 1995 to make the defi-
nition of staff rosters more flexible and significantly 
more decentralized; to add due recognition of per-
formance, merit and efficiency to considerations of 
mere seniority in career development; to promote the 
assignment of individual responsibilities; to interlink 
recognition of individual performance with that of 
the institution, and to make continued employment 
in the system subject to competitions. However, 
this initiative was shelved (Sojo, 1996c). 
In this respect, it is worth reflecting about a 
particular feature of a public health system which 
stands out in international comparisons as an 
example of notable equity, efficacy and efficiency: 
namely, that of Canada. Although Canadian hospitals 
have a system of budgets, the doctors who work in 
them do not earn a fixed salary: their wages depend 
on the number of patients they attend under a system 
of free choice by patients of any of the doctors on the 
hospital staff, in accordance with a scale of charges 
set by each province (White, 1997, p. 44). 
43
 "The possibility of terminating staff members' contracts must 
be simplified at the national level. At present, the steps that 
must be fulfilled are due process, appeal, the local commission, 
and the Central Labour Relations Commission, and this is where 
the bottleneck lies: an Act of Parliament is required to regulate 
this aspect, and an effort must be made to unify the form of 
hiring for all the different sectors". These were some of the 
challenges referred to by Dr. Jiménez in the interview men-
tioned earlier. 
Continued occupation of management posts 
should also be linked with (he achievement of the 
proposed objectives. The reform makes it indispensa-
ble to develop management skills at various levels. 
The CCSS contracts also aim to improve the in-
formation available on the finances of the supplier 
agents. With regard to financial management in the 
strict sense, however, the contracts do not provide for 
instruments, indicators or activities designed to meas-
ure costs which would make it possible to advance 
directly in the measurement of financial and eco-
nomic performance and impute costs to the products. 
This lack could be a serious obstacle for the estab-
lishment of the desired financing model, and this 
should be taken into account when formulating future 
contracts. 
Moreover, the contracts do not currently include 
convincing economic incentives. With regard to the 
economic incentives fund, mention has already been 
made of its weakness in generating such incentives in 
the short term, since the generation of savings which 
is supposed to provide it with its resources is ex-
tremely limited in the current conditions. Further-
more, there has not yet been any decision to allow the 
fund to be used to grant wage incentives on merit. 
It is therefore debated whether it is really desir-
able to introduce a system of performance incentives, 
whether it should be of an individual or collective 
nature -for work groups or specific units of the or-
ganization- and whether it fits in with the perform-
ance indicators provided by the management 
contracts. Among the range of possibilities in the 
case of economic incentives there is the possibility of 
introducing performance-linked wages. The system-
atic use of training or the granting of fellowships 
could also be useful for this purpose. 
It is likewise crucial to lay down clear provisions 
for penalizing both the suppliers, if they do not fulfill 
the agreements, and the purchaser, if he does not ful-
fill his tasks of providing support for the contract: 
such penalties must have a clear legal basis. It is also 
necessary to coordinate the terms of the contracts 
with the execution of traditional auditing exercises, 
which must be modified in the light of the new dis-
tinction of functions and their interrelations. 
As noted in the evaluation exercises, it is essen-
tial that staff members should know the results of 
the contracts so that, since they are participants in 
their strengths and weaknesses, they can collaborate 
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in the formulation of strategies for tackling problems 
and improving quality day by day, in order to avoid 
discouragement. 
At the same time, in spite of all the asymmetries 
of information facing users and the restrictions on the 
sovereignty of the consumer typical of the health sec-
tor, when forming coalitions which seek excellence in 
the provision of health services the users are very 
important, as a source of external pressure on suppli-
ers and of signals which will help in "fixing prices" 
in the quasi-market from the demand side. This ex-
plains the importance of receiving, processing and 
responding in a timely and suitable manner to the 
opinions and complaints of clients, collected through 
the contracts and other means. Consolidating im-
provements in attention -for example, reducing wait-
ing lines and waiting lists- would undoubtedly bring 
about greater citizen support for the contracts, which 
would be very positive for the purposes set forth 
above. 
Another item which is important in this context 
is community participation. In the case of the hospi-
tals, Hospital Councils, which are foreshadowed in 
the recently established Health Councils, will be of 
fundamental importance. These Health Councils are 
of an advisory and community liaison nature and con-
sist of seven persons: a representative of the cess, a 
representative of the municipality, and five repre-
sentatives of community or service associations.44 
The success of the contracts will not depend only 
on the formal reorganization of the purchaser- sup-
plier relationship. It will also be necessary to consider 
how to modify the informal standards and rules 
which come to take on a binding nature and will be 
determined by the changes in the informal power re-
lations, also defining the results.45 
The development of quasi-markets is rooted in 
social and institutional relations (Ferlie, Ashbumer, 
Fitzgerald and Pettigrew, 1996). In considering the 
long-term effect of the introduction of contracts on 
the organizational patterns and inter-organizational 
behaviour of health quasi-markets, particular impor-
tance is assumed by the professional networks of 
medical and paramedical staff and the weight and 
influence acquired by their management segment, 
since these professions had traditionally enjoyed a 
large measure of self-regulation. 
The challenge is of vast extent: it consists no less 
than of harnessing the will of politicians, staff mem-
bers and the citizens at large in support of a commit-
ment to excellence in the CCSS which will place the 




 Advocates of maximum decentralization of the suppliers, 
like Dr. Jiménez, consider that these Councils should be given 
sufficient authority to become Governing Boards of each hos-
pital, while the Central Governing Board, because of its politi-
cal nature, should lay down general policies and establish the 
budgetary limits (interview referred to earlier). 
45
 We thus take account of the warning given by Douglass 
North: "... although explicit rules provide us with a basic source 
of empirical materials by which we can test the performance 
of economies ¡n different conditions, the extent to which these 
rules have a single, invariable relation with performance is 
only limited. In other words, there is also a mixture of infor-
mal standards, rules and characteristics of a binding nature 
which simultaneously define both the range of choices and the 
results in terms of success, Consequently, if we only take 
account of the formal rules we will have an inadequate and 
often mistaken notion of the relation between formal limitations 
and performance". 
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Interviews 
On the experience of Costa Rica in health system reform 46 (held in San José, Costa Rica) 
Norma Ayala, staff member of the CCSS Modernization Project, 
29 August 1997 and 6 February 1998. 
Rodrigo Bartels, staff member of the CCSS Modernization Project, 
29 August 1997 and 6 February 1998. 
Adolfo Cartín, General Manager of the San Juan de Dios Hospital, 
5 February 1998. 
James Cercone, staff member of the CCSS Modernization Project, 
29 August 1997. 
Elias Jiménez, Director-General of the National Children's Hospital, 
5 February 1998. 
Mario León, staff member of the CCSS Modernization Project, 
29 August 1997. 
Fernando Marin, Deputy Minister of Health, 
26 August 1997. 
Luis Bernardo Saenz, Director of the CCSS Modernization Project, 
26 August 1997 and 26 February 1998. 
Alvaro Salas, Executive President of the CCSS, 
26 August 1997 and 5 February 1998. 
Manrique Soto Pacheco, Director-General of the San Juan de Dios Hospital, 
5 February 1998. 
Julieta Rodríguez, Manager of the Medical Division of the CCSS, 
26 August 1997. 
Herman Weinstock, Minister of Health, 
26 August 1997. 
On the experience of Chile in health system reform (held in Santiago, Chile) 
Pedro Croco, Director, Management Unit, Ministry of Health, 
3 September 1997. 
Rony Lenz, Director of the National Health Fund (FONASA), 
26 May 1998. 
César Oyarzo, former Director of FONASA, 
22 August 1997. 
The posts indicated are those which the interviewees occupied at the time of the interview. 
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